Amicus in People v. Moore: There is no justice when access is random or when the rules are unpredictable

In May, Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts and Chicago Council of Lawyers joined an amicus brief submitted by the Children and Family Justice Center at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law in the Illinois Supreme Court case, People v. Moore. Our Collaboration for Justice is proud to add our support to the brief which argues for full access to justice for youth in incarceration.

The Children and Family Justice Center entered the argument as amicus (friends of the court) to argue the issue of pleading and evidentiary requirements when persons convicted in late adolescence challenge the constitutionality of their sentences in successive post-conviction pleadings. Other signatories include Cabrini Green Legal Aid, the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (CLBB) at Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, Civitas Childlaw Center, the Juvenile Justice Initiative, Juvenile Law Center, the Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender, and the National Association of Social Workers.

They argue that when the challenge stems from Illinois cases recognizing the protections afforded to youth in criminal and non-criminal contexts, these protections should apply with equal force to young people over the age of 18. The extra protections for youth are based on an understanding of brain development relating to maturity, culpability, and the person’s understanding of proportionate punishment. For young people over the age of 18, whose brain development is also yet not complete, these same rationales apply

Pleading requirements must be relaxed to allow people without attorneys full access to the benefit of legal developments regarding the sentencing of people in late adolescence and early adulthood: in 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Roper v. Simmons that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on children who are convicted while under the age of 18, and then in 2012, ruled in Miller v. Alabama that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for children violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision of the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 

Following convictions in 1999, Tory Moore and Marvin Williams, each aged 19 at the time, received mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole. Given the changes in the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own constitution following Roper and Miller, Moore and Williams filed pro se motions for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition about the constitutionality of their sentences. The motions relied on established scientific evidence  regarding juvenile brain development and changes in the law to reflect the understanding that there is not a bright line between adolescence and maturity, with brain development critical to impulse-control, risk aversion, and consequence-assessment continuing into a person’s 20s. The motions were  denied by the trial courts, and the decisions later affirmed by the appellate court. The cases were consolidated on the issue for the Supreme Court. Our sign-on reflects our dedication to ensuring that all people have equal and equitable access to their rights under the constitution–and our commitment to ensuring that certain communities, including children, are not unduly burdened.

Since People v. Bailey (Illinois Supreme Court No. 121450) in 2017, in order to raise a claim of unconstitutionality in a successive petition, an appellant must show an objective cause for the failure to raise a claim of unconstitutionality in the initial petition and prejudice “by showing that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process” (page 3 of People v Moore). In his motion, Moore cited only the science comparing the brains of 19-year-olds to 17-year-olds and did not include any documentation of his own lack of brain development as a 19-year-old. The court acknowledged that Moore had shown cause by citing to the science and the line of cases applying it to situations like his, but found he did not include enough specific facts about his individual circumstances. Therefore, the court’s failure to consider his actions in the context of the soft boundary between adolescence and adulthood did not prejudice Moore at sentencing because he had not pled facts which would show his lack of maturity or culpability or which would demonstrate the particular disproportionately of his specific sentence.  

Amici, including Chicago Appleseed and the Council, argue this is too high a burden and that the Court should clarify and simplify the pleading standard needed for a successive post-conviction claim that a sentence is unconstitutional in the post-Miller landscape. 

The Court has and should look to changing scientific views and legal developments in state courts and legislatures in determining how to account for young age in the criminal legal system. Furthermore, the brief advocates especially for those filing pro se in their successive post-conviction petitions—who constitute the majority of petitioners. Unrepresented litigants, particularly those convicted in childhood or young-adulthood, experiencing issues with mental health, divergent development, and/or suffering from trauma, often have difficulty navigating the demanding current standards when they are unable to afford legal counsel and should be accommodated accordingly.

Chicago Appleseed and Chicago Council of Lawyers agree with the fellow signatories that “emerging adults embody developmental and neurological attributes akin to juveniles that warrant special consideration and protection under the law,” and that their opportunity to “challenge the constitutionality of their sentences in post-conviction petitions” has been, and must now be, recognized by the court (page 33 of amicus brief). In order to meaningfully provide the consideration and protection warranted to young people in our society, the “court should clarify and simplify the pleading standard required for emerging adults to advance a successive post-conviction claim that their sentence is unconstitutional. A low pleading threshold is both proper and appropriate for such petitioners.” The use of neuroscience to demonstrate the cruelty in sentencing young people to death in the U.S. profoundly changed our laws. Since Roper was decided, courts have struggled to understand and account for how adolescent brain development, which continues into young adulthood, impacts culpability and how it should inform sentencing.

As the science surrounding juvenile brain development continues to color how courts across the criminal legal system treat young people, we hope that the Illinois Supreme Court follows suit and allows the defendants to pursue further post-conviction proceedings to ensure necessary protections are provided. It is also critical, as argued in the amicus, that the Court create consistency in pleading standards for these “second-look” reviews for emerging adults.There is a deep inconsistency among Illinois courts not only in what a petitioner must show to be granted a hearing, but also in what factors are to be considered post-Miller

We believe that there is no justice when access to justice is random or in cases where the rules are unpredictable. The court has an opportunity to ease burdens on unrepresented people and clarify standards for attorneys at the same time. The Collaboration for Justice, Chicago Appleseed and Chicago Council of Lawyers, were grateful for the opportunity to sign on to this brief. Check back here for updates as the case progresses.


Written by Elizabeth Monkus, Program Attorney for the Collaboration for Justice; Lauren May, Law Student Intern for Chicago Appleseed and rising second-year student at New York University School of Law; and Audrey Shadle, Communications Intern for Chicago Appleseed and rising third-year at Williams College.